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AN  ANALYSIS  OF OPTIMAL FARM  CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Wesley  N.  Musser,  Fred C.  White, and John C.  McKissick
Use  of  debt  in  financing  agricultural  firms  is  an  weak  theoretical  framework.  Many  earlier  writings
issue  of  perennial  interest.  Much  of  this  interest  have  been  conceptualized  in  a  marginal  returns  and
reflects  farmers'  disastrous  experience  with  debt  marginal  costs  framework.  Conceptual  and  empirical
during  the  Great  Depression.  The  foreclosed  mort-  difficulties  in  including  risk  in  this  standard  frame-
gages  and  bankruptcies  of  that  era  reaffirmed  an  work  limit its usefulness  in  analyzing situations where
historical  feeling  that achieving  a level  of zero debt or  risk  is  important.  In  corporate  finance  theory,  the
financial  leverage  was  a  high  priority  goal.  E.G.  concept  of  cost  of  capital  is  utilized  to  analyze
Johnson,  who was  Chief  of the  Economic  and Credit  optimum  level  of  financial  leverage  [1,  11].  While
Research  Division of the  Farm  Credit Administration,  Hopkin,  Barry  and  Baker  present  a  theoretical  dis-
articulated  the  position  in  the  1940  Yearbook  of  cussion  of  this  concept  in  their  textbook  [5,  pp.
Agriculture that this goal  is even more important than  251-256],  it  has  not  been  integrated  into  empirical
increasing  profits:  "It  may be well  to emphasize  again  analysis  in  agricultural  finance.  The  purpose  of  this
that  while  credit  properly  used may  help farmers  to  paper  is  to  explore  applicability  of  the  concept  of
increase  their  income  and  raise  their  standard  of  cost  of  capital  in  analyzing  farmers'  decisions  to
living,  the  fact  must  not  be  overlooked  that  more  utilize  financial  leverage.  Specific  objectives  include:
credit  will  not  cure  all  the  ills  of  agriculture.  The  (1)  a  brief  discussion  of  the  concept  of  cost  of
greatest  need  is  to assist  the  farmers in getting  out of  capital,  (2) derivation  of an empirical model  from the
debt,  not  deeper  into  it,"  [6,  p.  754].  As  memories  cost  of  capital  concept  to  analyze  the  decision  to
of  the  Great  Depression  faded,  agricultural  econo-  employ  financial  leverage  and  (3)  presentation  of a
mists  tended  to emphasize  the effect of debt on farm  discriminant  analysis  which  tests  the  model  for  a
size  and  therefore  net  income.  Heady  emphasized  sample  of Georgia  farmers.
increased  income  from  obtaining  more  resources
through  use  of  debt  [3,  pp.  535-561],  and  Hopkin,
Barry  and  Baker stressed  that leverage  could increase  CAPITAL  CONCEPT
rate  of  growth  of  farm  firms  [5,  pp.  143-163].  In  general  terms,  cost  of capital  is the  weighted
Increased  use and  acceptability  of leverage  in  agricul-  sum  of  the  component  cost  of  each  capital  source
ture  has  stimulated  some  empirical  research  on  weighted  according  to  its  long-run  level of use  in  the
factors  affecting  the  level  of farm  debt.  The  earliest  firm's  capital  structure.  If  a  farm  firm  is  financed
research attempts  in this area used time series data [4,  with  two  categories  of  debt  and  proprietor  equity,
7,  9].  Lins  and  Donaldson  [8]  provided  a  recent  the cost of capital  is calculated as  follows:
cross-sectional  analysis  of level  of farm  debt in  1970.
One  limiting  factor  in  empirical  analysis  of  K  D  D  K  D
agricultural  use  of  financial  leverage  has  been  the  (A) 
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1This  section  synthesizes  the  traditional  theory  of  cost  of  capital.  The  seminal  work  in  this  area  is Solomon  [10].  This
subject matter is also  considered in corporate  finance textbooks such as Weston and Brigham  [11,  pp. 594-622].
163where  ciated with equity  capital  is generally  higher than  that
for  debt  because  of the  greater  risks associated  with
Ko - weighted average  cost of capital  ownership.  This  latter  point  results  in  KE generally
being  greater  than  KD for  any given  production  and
KD  = cost of debt  capital  financial  organization.  Despite  this  generalization,
KE  = cost of equity  capital  and  firms  typically  cannot minimize Ko by  using all debt.
^~~~~~~~~~D ~~Increasing  financial  leverage  increases  risk  for  both
= debt-asset  ratio  in  the  firm's capital  struc-  owners  and  lenders  so  that  both  KE and  KD are
ture.  increasing  functions  of  financial  leverage.  The
standard  formulation  is  that some  level  of debt, such
The  cost  of  debt,  KD,  is  the  after-tax  effective  as  0 <  D/A <  1,  minimizes  the cost of capital.
interest rate on debt and  is calculated  as follows:  Derivation  of hypotheses for empirical  analysis in
this  paper  requires  consideration  of  situations when
KD-  E  (d - T)  (2)  zero  financial  leverage  results  in  the  minimum
weighted  average cost of capital.  In equation  (1),  zero
where  financial  leverage  is  reflected  in  D/A= 0  and
Ko = KE.  One  obvious  situation  when  zero  D/A
ED  = current  effective  interest  rate  on debt  and  would  be  optimal  is  when  KE is  less  than  KD at  all
T = marginal  income  tax rate.  levels  of leverage.  While  this possibility is inconsistent
with  general  corporate  finance  theory,  Brigham  and
KE is  the historical  rate of return the  owner has been  Smith  argue  that  small  business  proprietors  will
receiving  on  his  equity  capital  with  his  particular  accept  lower  than competitive  returns on their equity
production  and  financial  organization  and  is  cal-  capital  because  of  the  pecuniary  and,  more  impor-
culated as  follows:  tant,  nonpecuniary  advantages  of  self-employment
NP  -- OL +  LV (1-  TO  and  business  ownership  [2].  This finance  proposition
KE =  E  (3)  is  familiar to agricultural  economists;  in fact,  Hopkin,
Barry  and  Baker  hypothesized  that  farmers  in  the
where  past  have  judged  equity  capital  as  costing  less  than
debt capital  [5, pp.  254-255].
NP = net farm profits after taxes  The  small  firm  situation  of  KE  <  KD  is  not
OL = value  of unpaid family  labor  necessary  for  zero  debt  to  minimize  Ko. Situations
LV = amount  of increase  in land value  can  exist  when  K  > KD,  and  zero  D/A  is  also
Tc = capital gains  tax rate and  optimal.  Figure  1  illustrates  these  two possibilities. 2
E = owner equity.  The  curves  KE,  KD  and  Ko,  which  are  linear  for
graphic  convenience,  illustrate  a  case  in  which
The  behavioral  assumption  of  the  theory  of  KE  <  KD  for  all levels  of leverage  and  the  minimum
optimal  capital  structure  is  that the  firm  operates  at  Ko occurs  when  D/A = 0.  However,  the  curves  KE,
that  level  of  financial  leverage,  measured  by  D/A,  KD and  Ko illustrate  a  case  for which  the minimum
which  minimizes  the  weighted  average  cost of capital  Ko occurs  at  D/A = 0  even  though KE >  KD  for  all
in  equation  (1).  To  explore  the  implications  of this  levels  of D/A. Salient features  of this second case  are:
behavioral  assumption,  an  understanding  of  likely  (1)  absolute  difference  between  KE and  KD is small
magnitudes  of  KE and  KD and  their  responses  to  and  (2)  rate of increase  in KD with respect to changes
increases  in  D/A  is  necessary.  KE  and  KD in  in  leverage  is  equal  to that  for KE. If the  difference
equations  (2)  and  (3)  measure  the  rate  of return that  between  KE and  KD was  larger and/or if the increase
owners  and  lenders,  respectively,  demand  to  supply  in  KE in  response  to  increases  in  leverage  was  larger
funds  to a given firm.  Like any rate of return, KE and  relative  to that for  KD,  D/A =  0  would  no  longer  be
KD include  the  risk-free  interest  rate  and  a  risk  optimal.  The  responsiveness  of  KE and  KD to
premium.  This  risk premium varies directly  with risks  leverage  depends  on  risk  preferences  and  impact  of
associated  with  production  and financial  organization  leverage  on  riskiness  of  the  owner's  equity  and  the
of  the  firm.  Furthermore,  the  risk  premium  asso-  lender's  debt.  For  any  given  attitude  of  lenders
2Figure  1  is  an  abstraction  from  general  theory  and  the  institutional  environment  in agricultural  finance.  In  the general
theory,  the  KE,  KD  and K O curves are not linear. KD for farmers  would also not be continuous since lenders  do not ration credit
with  interest  rates  but  with  amounts  of  loans.  However,  representing  these  points  in  Figure  1  would  not  alter  the  basic
propositions  and  would complicate  the  graphic  analysis. Weston and Brigham  use similar  theoretical abstractions  in discussing the
theory of the cost of capital  [11,  pp. 636-657].
164the  cost  of  capital  framework.  In  this  section,  an
Percent
empirical  model  is developed  which  includes variables
to  test  the  influence  of  these  two  factors.  In
development  of  this  model,  empirical  propositions
Ij  J  ~  ^from  the  literature  on  agricultural  finance  are  inte-
1K'  ^  grated  with  the  theoretical  results  of  the  previous
\~J-~  ^  ^  ^^section.
I  K6,  - I  /  —  ^  ^  ^Identification  of variables  to  analyze  the relative
I  KD  /^  ^  levels  of  KE  and  KD  requires  particular  attention  to
KD.  As  indicated  in equation  (3),  KE  depends  largely
/  K^^^^  /^~ /^  ^^on  factors  which  are  observable  in  operation  of  a
farm  business.  Estimation  of KD  is  more difficult.  As
/  ^^^~~~KE  /~  ~shown  in equation  (2),  an estimate  of KD  requires the
effective  interest  rate,  which  is  difficult  to estimate
for  farmers  with  no debt.  The  approach taken  in  this
study  is  to  utilize  estimates  of  KE  as  a  variable  to
reflect  differences  between  KE  and KD.  Since interest
rates  are  relatively  uniform  among  farmers  [3,  pp.
558-559],  the  main  variation  in  KD  among  farm
firms  results  from  variation  in  the  income  tax  rate.
The  depressing  effect  of  the  tax  rate  on  KD  would
also  be  positively  related  to  KE  since  a  higher  KE
Debt-Asset  Ratio  1  reflects  a  higher net income  with  a  given investment.
Thus,  the  level  of KE  measures  both  the relationship
FIGURE  1.  COST  OF  EQUITY  (KE),  COST  OF  between  KE  and  a  standard  interest  rate  and  the
DEBT  (KD),  AND  COST  OF  CAPITAL  effect of taxes on KD.
(KO)  CURVES  ILLUSTRATING  ZERO  In  the  theoretical  area  of  risk  preferences  of
LEVERAGE  IN  AN  OPTIMAL  CAPI-  farmers  and  lenders,  operator's  age  and  enterprise
TAL STRUCTURE  portfolio  effects  were  included  to  represent  impor-
tant differences.  Inclusion  of  age  is  in  recognition  of
towards  the  firm  which  is  expressed  in  a  given  KD  the  inverse  relationship  between  debt  and  age  which
function,  KE  will  increase  faster  with  leverage  the  is  often  noted  in  literature  [3,  pp.  549-550;  5,  pp.
greater  the  degree  of risk  aversion  of the farmer.  For  138-141;  1,  pp.  23-24].  This  literature  indicates that
any  given  level  of the  KE function,  KD  will  be more  farmers  begin  to  stress  stability  of income during  the
responsive  to  leverage,  the  more  risky  the  lender  middle  of  the  life  cycle  more  than  in  their  younger
perceives  the  debt or,  in more conventional  terms,  the  years.  In  the  framework  of the cost of capital  model,
borrower's credit worthiness.  farmers would  be expected to require  a higher level  of
In  summary,  the  cost of capital concept  provides  KE  for  positive  levels  of  leverage  as  they  get older.
a convenient framework  for identification of situations  Thus,  increasing  age  would  be  expected  to  be
in which  a farmer would be expected to have no debt in  associated  with  lower likelihood  of using  debt in  the
his  financial  structure.  If cost  of equity  is  less  than  capital structure.
that  of  debt,  a  clear  case  for  no  financial  leverage  Enterprise  portfolio  effects  are  a  result  of  the
exists. If cost of equity is not much  larger than cost of  well-known  reduction  in  risk  from  diversification  in
debt,  zero financial leverage  can also be optimal  if the  farm  organization.  For  farmers  with  a  specialized
owner's  risk  premium  for  debt  increases  faster  than  farm  organization,  the  risk  of any  particular  level  of
that  for  lenders.  Thus,  analysis  of  the  use  of  debt  financial  leverage  is  higher.  If  farmers'  risk  patterns
among  farm  firms  can  concentrate  on  the  relative  follow  the  typical  pattern  of  decreasing  rate  of
level  of  KE to  KD  and  of  factors  affecting  the  risk  personal  substitution  of  risk  for returns,  it could  be
preferences  of farmers  and agricultural  lenders.  expected  that  the  rate  of increase  in KE with respect
to  leverage  would  be  greater  on  specialized  than  on
diversified  farms.  Ideally,  portfolio effects  would  be
AN EMPIRICAL  MODEL  mnfmeasured  as  a percentage  of net income  derived from
In  the  previous  section,  two  factors  were  the  major enterprise.  The problems of allocating  costs
deduced  as  being  important  in  identifying  situations  to  particular  enterprises  makes  this a  difficult  proce-
in  which  zero  financial  leverage  would  be optimal  in  dure  even  if complete  farm  record  data are  available.
165Thus,  percentage  of  total  gross  income  from  the  small  amount  of  debt  were  likely  to  include  cases
major  enterprise  is  utilized  as  a  portfolio  effects  which  were  temporary  debtors  rather  than  having a
variable.  long-run  goal  of  including  debt  in  their  financial
For  age  and portfolio effects to have  the hypoth-  structure,  farmers  with  D/A  <  .05  were  classified  in
esized  relationship  on  capital  structure,  their  effect  the no-debt  group prior  to the statistical  analysis.
on  the  responsiveness  of  KD  function  to  leverage  Besides  statistical  results  of  the  discriminant
must  be  contrasted  to  that  on  KE  function.  This  analysis,  a  breakeven  value  for  each  independent
proposition  has  largely  been  ignored  in the literature,  variable  was  calculated  using  sample  means.  This
However,  a  case  can  logically  be  built  that  these  value  was  calculated  by  equating  the  discriminant
variables  do  not have  as  large  an  effect  on lenders  as  function  to zero:
on farm  owners.  The  effect of  age  on  KE  arises from  2
personal  preferences  not  from  productive  charac-  a+  ±  biXi +  bkXk  =  (4)
teristics  of  the  farm.  Therefore,  age  would  not  be  i-1
expected  to be perceived by lenders  as increasing  risk.  where
For  portfolio  effects,  farm  production  does  not
become  more  risky.  However,  lenders  are  concerned  discriminant  func-
with  security  values  as  much  as,  or  more  than  with 
income,  and  the  risk  associated  with  security  values  bi and  bk =  coefficients  in  discriminant function
on  specialized  farms  relative  to  diversified  farms  Xi  sample  mean  for  the  two  variables
would  be expected  to increase  as much  as  the relative  and
risk  of income.  Thus, effects of age  and specialization
Xk = variable (izk) for which a break-even on  KD  would  not  be  expected  to  be  as  large  as  on 
KEvy~~~~~~~~~~~~  - ~~~value  is being calculated. KE'
In  summary,  variables  in  the  empirical  analysis  Solving  equation  (4)  for  each  variable  in  turn  iden-
include  cost  of equity,  age  and  percentage  of  gross  tifies  a  break-even  value  of the  independent  variable
income  from  major  enterprise.  The  first  variable  in  reference  to  classification  into  debt  and  no-debt
measures  differences  between  KE  and  KD  functions  groups.  The  break-even  value  for  each  independent
and  the  second  and  third  differences  in  farmers'  risk  variable  is  the  value  for  which  the  average  farm
preferences.  operator  would  have  equal  probability  of  being
classified  in  the  debt  and  no-debt  groups.  For higher
values  than  the  break-even  value  for  each  respective
DATA AND  METHODOLOGY  value,  the  farmer  would  be  more  likely  to  be
A  sample  of 121 Georgia  farmers was used in this  classified  in  one  of  the  groups,  and  for  lower values
study.  These  farm  operators  were  selected  through  a  he  would  be more  likely  to  be  classified  in  the other
stratified  random  sample  and  thus  represented  a  group.
cross-sectional sample  of the State's farmers.  Informa-
tion  on  sales,  operating  expenses,  net  taxable  farm
income,  income  tax  payments,  value  of assets,  debt,  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
interest  rate  paid  and  family  and  operator labor use  Results  of the  empirical  analysis  are presented in
was  obtained  from  interviews  and  farm  tax  records  Tables  1  and  2.  In Table  1,  the  discriminant equation
for  1972.  Secondary  data  on  wage  rates  and  land  for classification  from  debt  into  the  no-debt group  is
values supplemented  the  primary  data;  the  wage data  presented  along with  F values  for  the coefficients.  In
was  the  Georgia  average  rate  for hired  farm  labor for  Table  2,  means  of  the  classification  variables  in  the
1972  while  the  rate  of land value  appreciation varied  sample and  in  both debt and  no-debt  subsamples  are
by  crop  reporting  districts.  Since  optimal  capital  presented  along  with  break-even  values  calculated
structure  is  a long-run  concept,  time  series  data may  with  the  discriminant  function  of  Table  1  and
be  preferable  to  using  data  for  a  single  year.  Data  equation  (4).
from 1972 would, however,  be more appropriate  than  Results  of  the  discriminant  analysis  were  very
some  other years since that year was representative  of  satisfactory.  All  variables  were  significant,  with  KE
the average  recent farming  situation.  and  age  being  significant  at  the  one  percent  level.
Statistical  analysis  of  the  empirical  model  in-  Furthermore,  96  out  of  the  121  sample  cases  were
volved  derivation  of a  classification  function  for debt  classified  in  the  correct group.  More  importantly,  all
and  no-debt  groups  through  discriminant  analysis,  coefficient  values  had  the  expected  influence  in  the
with  the  three  variables  discussed  previously  serving  discriminant  analysis.  Since  the  coefficient  for  KE  is
as  discriminating variables.  Since  farmers  with  only  a  positive,  an  increase  in  KE  would  increase  the
166TABLE  1.  DISCRIMINANT  FUNCTIONS  WHICH  more  concerned  with  risk  of  financial  leverage  than
CLASSIFY  FARM  OPERATORS  INTO  diversified farmers.
DEBT AND NO-DEBT GROUPS  The  break-even value  for KE  of 4.05 percent  is  of
more  concern.  With  interest  rates  in  the  range  of
Variables  Coefficients  F-Value
_____________________________  seven  percent  in  1972,  a farmer would  have to have  a
Constant  4.2527  marginal  income  tax  rate  of 45 percent  for KD  to be
Cost  of  equity  (KE)  0.0977  16.2**  less  than  4.05  percent.  As  this  marginal  tax  rate  was
Age  of  farm operator  -0.0702  11.7**  for  the  taxable  income  bracket  of $26,000-$32,000,
Major  source  of  income  as  a  this  estimate  of the  break-even  value  for KE appears
percentage  of  total  income  -0.0132  3.1*
to  understate the minimum  Kg for the average  farmer
to  introduce  debt  into  his  capital  structure.  For  a
*.10 level of significance.
**.O1  level of significance.  farmer  to  take  out  a  new  loan  in  1972,  his interest
charge  might  be  seven  to eight percent,  so  he  would
have  to  have  KE almost  that  high  unless  his taxable
income  were  high.  A  possible  explanation  for  this
result  is that many of the sample  farmers with  debt in
TABLE 2.  VARIABLES  USED  IN DISCRIMINANT  their capital  structure  took  out  loans  when  interest
ANALYSIS  WITH MEANS AND  BREAK-  rates  were  much  lower, say  four to six percent.  A  KD
EVEN VALUES  based  on  a lower  interest  rate  of the  1960s  could  be
lower  than 4.05  percent  for relatively low  tax rates:  a
Mean  Values
Debt  No  Debt  Total  Break-even  marginal  tax  rate of 20 percent  and an interest rate  of
Variables  Group  Group  Sample  Values _Variables  Cop  Cros_  p  Sple  Values  five percent  would  result  in  a  KD  =  4 percent.  Inter-
Cost  of  equity  (KE)  6.98  0.22  3.07  4.05  est  rates  increased  rapidly  in  the  early  1970s, but  it
Age  of  farm  operator  51.92  58.64  55.81  54.44  would  take many years for a cross-sectional  sample of
Major  source  of  income  as  farmers  to  completely  adjust  their capital  structures
a  percentage  of  total
income  48.17  60.59  55.36  48.09  to higher rates.
Number  of observations  51  70  121
CONCLUSIONS  AND IMPLICATIONS
likelihood  that a  farmer  would  be classified  as having  This  paper reports on research  which adapted  the
debt.  Similarly,  the  negative  coefficients  for age  and  concept  of  weighted  average  cost  of  capital  to
the  specialization  variable  indicates  that  increases  in  conceptualize  the  use  of  zero  financial  leverage
these  variables  increase  the  likelihood  that  farmers  among  many  farmers.  The concept was  demonstrated
will have  no debt.  to  be  consistent with previous  research  on  this  issue.
The  break-even  values  in Table  2 were  calculated  An  empirical  model  was  developed  which  included
with  discriminant  coefficients  and  sample  means.  cost of equity, age and a specialization  variable  to test
These  break-even  values  indicate  the  specific  magni-  applicability  of  the  model  for  a  sample  of  Georgia
tude  of variables  for which  the discriminant  function  farmers.  A  discriminant  analysis  of  the  sample  cor-
is  equated  to  zero  if other  variables  are held  at their  rectly classified  96  of the  121 farms in the sample with
mean values.  If a  particular  farmer  had  a mean  value  all coefficients  having expected  magnitudes and being
for  two  variables  and  a  value  of  the  other  variable  significant.  Thus, the cost of capital concept provides a
above  this break-even  value,  he would  be expected to  useful theory to derive empirical models for analysis of
be in the  group favored  by the coefficient  of the third  issues associated  with  capital  structure  of agriculture.
variable.  For example, a farmer with  55.36 percent  of  Several  shortcomings  of  the  analysis  need  to  be
his income  from one commodity  source and  an age of  stressed.  Since  optimal capital  structure  is  a  long-run
55.81  years  would  have  debt  if his  KE were  greater  concept,  the  particular  empirical  results  are  sensitive
than 4.05 percent.  to  short-run  phenomena.  A  cross-section  sample with
Estimated break-even  values  for  age  and speciali-  several  years  of  time  series  data  would  be  more
zation  are  consistent  with  prior  expectations.  The  appropriate  than  the  one-year  cross-sectional  data
54.44  value  for  age  is  in  the  middle  age  range  in  utilized  in  this  study.  Using  only  one  year  of data
which  farmers  are  generally  considered  to  be  in-  would  be  appropriate  during  a  period  of  stable
creasingly  interested  in-  stability  of  income  and  internal  and  external  financial  conditions  for agricul-
therefore  lower  financial  leverage.  Farmers  with  ture.  As  such  a  situation  is  rare,  perhaps  the  model
income  from  one  source  being  greater  than  48.09  could  be  developed  into  an  adaptive  expectations
percent  of  total  farm  income  would  be  specialists  framework.
167REFERENCES
[1]  Boehlje,  Michael.  "The  Entry-Growth-Exit  Processes  in  Agriculture,"  Southern Journal of Agricultural
Economics, Volume  5, No.  1,  July 1973, pp.  23-26.
[2]  Brigham,  Eugene  F.  and  Keith  V.  Smith.  "The  Cost  of  Capital  to  the  Small  Firm,"  The  Engineering
Economist, XIII,  Fall  1967, pp.  1-26.
[3]  Heady,  Earl  0.  Economics  of Agricultural Production and Resource  Use,  Prentice-Hall  Inc.,  Englewood
Cliffs,  New Jersey,  1952.
[4]  Herr,  William.  "Understanding  Changes  in  Non-real  Estate  Farm  Debt,"  Agricultural Finance Review,
Volume  23,  November  1967, pp.  23-32.
[5]  Hopkin,  John  A.,  Peter J.  Barry  and  C.  B.  Baker. Financial  Management in Agriculture,  Danville,  Illinois:
The Interstate  Printers & Publishers,  Inc., 1973.
[6]  Johnson,  E.  C.  "Agricultural  Credit,"  Farmers in  a  Changing  World,  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture,
Washington,  D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing  Office,  1940, pp.  740-754.
[7]  Lins,  David.  "Determinants  of Net  Changes  in  Farm  Real  Estate  Debt," Agricultural  Economics Research,
U.S. Department of Agriculture,  Economic  Research Service,  Volume  24, January  1972.
[8]  Lins,  David  and  Timothy  R.  Donaldson.  "Explaining  Farm  Operators  Debt:  An  Application  of  the
Automatic  Interaction  Detector  Technique,"  Contributed  Paper,  American  Agricultural  Economics
Association  Annual  Meeting,  Pennsylvania  State  University,  University  Park,  Pennsylvania,  August
15-18,  1976.
[9]  Penson,  John  B.,  Jr.  "Demand  for  Financial  Assets  in  the  Farm Sector:  A Portfolio  Balance  Approach,"
American Journal of Agricultural  Economics, Volume 54,  No.  2,  May 1972, pp.  163-174.
[10]  Solomon,  Ezra.  The Theory of Financial  Management, New York:  Columbia University  Press,  1963.
[11]  Weston,  J. Fred  and Eugene  F. Brigham. Managerial  Finance, Fifth Edition,  Hinsdale, Illinois:  Dryden  Press,
1975.
168